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Stanley v. Justices of the Supreme Court 57
(decided April 24, 1995)

Defendant argued that he was entitled to protection against
double jeopardy under both the Federal5 8 and New York State
Constitutions. 5 9 He contended that there was no "manifest

necessity" for the grant of a mistrial by the trial court. 60 The

Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected the defendant's
contention and held that a grant of a mistrial rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. 6 1 The court explained that the

unavailability of a critical prosecution eyewitness was a proper
reason for the trial court's exercise of discretion to grant a
62

mistrial.
In People v. Ferguson,6 3 the New York Court of Appeals
discussed the principles involved in double jeopardy protection.
The court stated that the Double Jeopardy Clauses in both the
New York State and Federal Constitutions "protect an accused

against multiple prosecutions for the same offense."64 Although
it is within the trial court's discretion to grant a mistrial without
57. 625 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
59. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .. . .
Id.
60. Stanley, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 67 N.Y.2d 383, 494 N.E.2d 77, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1986). In
Ferguson, a juror had been injured in a car accident and notified the court of
the accident and his hospitalization. Id. at 386, 494 N.E.2d at 79, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 974. Since there were no alternate jurors, the judge called a
mistrial even though the court had not inquired into the seriousness of the
juror's injuries or the expected length of the proposed hospital stay. Id. The
defense counsel remained silent. Id. at 387, 494 N.E.2d at 79, 502 N.Y.S.2d
at 974. Prior to the second trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the
indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Id. The motion was denied because the
attorney had not objected to the mistrial. Id. The defendant was convicted and
the conviction was upheld on appeal. Id.
64. Id. at 387, 494 N.E.2d at 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 975 (citations omitted).
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the consent of the defendant, there must be no manifest necessity
in order for the defendant to be entitled to the protection of
double jeopardy. 65 The court stated that "[a]lthough the trial
court's view as to the necessity for discharging the jury is entitled
66
to deference, its discretion is not unlimited."
Further, in Hall v. Potoker,67 the court concluded that there is
no abuse of discretion by the trial court when available
alternatives are explored and the decision is based upon valid
considerations. 6 8 The court explained that "when the Trial Judge
has properly explored the appropriate alternatives, and there is a
sufficient basis in the record for a mistrial, an appellate court will
' 69
be hesitant to interfere with the exercise of this discretion."
The court noted that "where the mistrial is premised upon a
claimed unavailability of crucial prosecution evidence, the
validity of that claim is subjected to 'the strictest scrutiny. "'70
Moreover, in People v. Michael,7 1 the court demonstrated a
clear case of abuse of discretion. In Michael, the court declared
that when a mistrial is granted because "a delay in the trial would
inconvenience the court and the jury, and without any inquiry
into the effect of such a delay on the jury's ability to render a fair
verdict, discretion falters and abuse appears." 72 The court stated
that "[a] defendant's right to have his fate determined as
expeditiously as possible and by the first jury to which the case is
presented is a basic one, and may not be set aside without strong
reason." 73 The court reasoned that "[w]eighed in the balance of
judicial obligations, a necessary change in travel plans is of little

65. Id. at 388, 494 N.E.2d at 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. 49 N.Y.2d 501, 403 N.E.2d 1210, 427 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1980).
68. Id. at 507, 403 N.E.2d at 1214, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
69. Id. at 505, 403 N.E.2d at 1213, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 214 (citation
omitted).
70. Id. at 506, 403 N.E.2d at 1213, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 214 (citations
omitted).
71. 48 N.Y.2d 1, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979).

72. Id. at 11, 394 N.E.2d at 1139, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
73. Id. at 10, 394 N.E.2d at 1138, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
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significance." 74 Accordingly, a trial court cannot declare a

mistrial simply because a delay would be inconvenient.
The Stanley court referred to double jeopardy protection under
both the Federal and New York State Constitutions. 7 5 Both
prohibit retrial for the same crime unless there is manifest
necessity for the mistrial. 76 New York has codified some of these
principles in Criminal Procedure Law section 280.10(3). 7 7 Under
section 280.10(3) the trial judge must declare a mistrial under
78
certain circumstances.

CRIMINAL COURT
NEW YORK CITY
People v. Frank79
(decided September 11, 1995)

The defendant moved for a dismissal claiming that the
temporary suspension of his driver's license, due to his alleged
refusal to submit to a chemical test, constituted double jeopardy
in violation of both the New York State80 and Federal
74. Id.
75. Stanley v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 625 N.Y.S.2d 622, 622
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
76. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d at 9, 394 N.E.2d at 1138, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
77. N.Y. CPi. PRoc. LAW § 280.10(3) (McKinney 1993).
78. N.Y. CRri. PRoc. LAW § 280.10(3). Section 280.10(3) provides in
pertinent part:
At any time during the trial, the court must declare a mistrial and order
a new trial of the indictment under the following circumstances:
3. Upon motion of either party or upon the court's own motion,
when it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in
conformity with law.
Id.
79. 631 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Crim. Ct. New York County 1995).
80. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. . . ." Id.
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